Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights by Harris, Pamala
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2001
Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal
Rights
Pamala Harris
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: The Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 Clev. St. L. Rev. 133 (2001)
 133 
COMPELLED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PREGNANT 
WOMEN: THE BALANCING OF MATERNAL AND  
FETAL RIGHTS 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION  ................................................................... 134 
 II. BACKGROUND  .................................................................... 136 
 A. Motherhood Defined  .................................................. 136 
 B. Fetal Rights Defined  .................................................. 137 
 1. The Moral Status of the Fetus  ............................ 138 
 2. Fetal Protection Policies  ..................................... 138 
 3. Fetal Rights Acts  ................................................ 139 
 III. ANALYSIS OF THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS  .............................. 140 
 A. The American College of Obstetricians and  
Gynecologists Position on Maternal-Fetal Rights  .... 141 
 B. The American Medical Association’s Position on 
 Maternal-Fetal Rights  .............................................. 142 
 IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ISSUES  ........................................ 143 
 A. The Legal Position on Maternal-Fetal Rights  ........... 143 
 B. Constitutional Issues  .................................................. 145 
 1. The Right of  Privacy  ......................................... 145 
 2. The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause  .............. 147 
 C. Case Law  ................................................................... 148 
 D. Statutory Law  ............................................................. 150 
 V. CONTROL OF PREGNANCY  .................................................. 152 
 A. Direct Control  ............................................................ 153 
 1. Forced Prenatal Treatment  ................................. 153 
 2. Forced Cesarean Sections  ................................... 154 
 3. Forced Hospital Deliveries  ................................. 155 
 4. Forced Fetal Surgery  .......................................... 156 
 B. Indirect Control  ......................................................... 157 
 1. Tort Liability  ...................................................... 157 
 2. Criminal Prosecutions of Pregnant Women  
Who Are Addicts  ................................................ 158 
 3. Finding Child Neglect or Abuse Based on  
Mother’s Conduct During Pregnancy  ................. 160 
 VI. ANALYSIS OF BALANCING FETAL AND MATERNAL  
RIGHTS  ............................................................................... 161 
 VII. CONCLUSION  ...................................................................... 161 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
134 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:133 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The general rule of medical treatment is that doctors may not act without a 
patient’s informed consent.1  Informed consent promotes patient autonomy2 and 
safeguards the integrity of the physician.3  Medical and legal experts agree that the 
informed consent process is “an invitation, asking for consent, seeking authorization 
to proceed, and not making a demand under the guise of a symbolic egalitarian 
gesture.”4  This consent process becomes more complicated when the patient is 
pregnant because The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
recognizes the fetus as a separate patient5 even though the woman is the only patient 
able to give informed consent.  
A competent pregnant woman may, for many reasons, refuse medical treatment, 
that a physician regards as beneficial to the woman, the fetus, or in some instances, 
both.  These reasons may range from fear of surgery or other invasive procedures to 
a deep religious belief that conflicts with the physician’s recommended treatment.  
These reasons may also include the pregnant woman’s desire to preserve her own 
health.  Physicians may find the refusal of medical treatment at odds with the desire 
to deliver a healthy baby.  When a pregnant woman refuses treatment that will 
benefit her fetus, either directly or indirectly, she places her physician in a dilemma 
of conflicting loyalties.  The physician must now choose between honoring the 
woman’s refusal, which may subject the fetus to a possible fate of injury, disability, 
or even death, or despite her objections, compel her to treatment by seeking a court 
order. 
If the physician chooses to honor the pregnant woman’s refusal of treatment, he 
appears to be abandoning the fetus, a patient to whom he owes an ethical and legal 
                                                                
1Early statements of this axiom are introduced in Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 
250, 251 (1891) (“[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of 
law.”) and Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d. 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1957) (“[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability 
if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the 
patient to the proposed treatment”).  
2
“The root premise is the concept, fundamental in American Jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body…’ True consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of 
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the 
risks attendant upon each.”  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).  
3See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES of BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 67-
113 (3d ed. 1989).  
4ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION of CLINICAL RESEARCH 99 (2d ed. 1986) 
(quoting Jay Katz, The Regulation of Human Research–Reflections and Proposals, 21 
CLINICAL RES. 785-91 (1973)).  
5AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, 
OPINION NUMBER 55, PATIENT CHOICE MATERNAL FETAL CONFLICT (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter 
ACOG]. 
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duty of care.6  If the physician chooses to treat the pregnant woman, he must 
ethically justify his refusal to honor the woman’s right to control her own body.  This 
dilemma may lead the physician to seek and obtain a court order compelling the 
pregnant woman to submit to the recommended treatment regardless of her refusal.  
Whether it is a physician or a judge attending to this dilemma, the same question 
arises: should a pregnant woman be compelled to submit to medical treatment that, 
for her own reasons, she does not want? 
This note explores the question: is it ever permissible for a physician or a judge 
to compel a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment for the benefit of her 
fetus? This note begins by examining the ideology of motherhood7 and the legal 
status of the fetus.8  This note then examines the ethical aspects and legal issues 
involved in compelling a pregnant woman to undergo treatment for the benefit of her 
fetus.  This note then explores the controls of pregnancy that result in maternal-fetal 
conflicts.  Finally, this note examines the court’s use of a balancing test in reaching 
decisions in cases of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women.   
I argue that neither physicians nor the judiciary should compel a pregnant woman 
to submit to medical treatment for the sake of her fetus.  This conclusion is based on 
a view of the legal status of the fetus and the woman’s constitutional right to privacy.  
The fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment,9 and the pregnant 
woman should be afforded the constitutionally protected right to privacy that would 
encompass the right to be free of bodily invasions.10  Furthermore, for public policy 
reasons, it is not advisable for the law to use its power to invade a person’s body for 
the benefit of another.  “To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual and 
would impose a rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where 
the line would be drawn.”11  This note concludes by suggesting that a competent 
                                                                
6Id.  
7Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983) (husband petitioned the court to order his wife 
to submit to a cerlage operation in order to hold the pregnancy.  The judge ruled that the 
state’s interest in the fetus justified and overrode that pregnant woman’s free exercise of 
religion.  The state’s interest was based on the “fundamental and traditional interest in the 
physical and mental health of all parents, their children already born and their unborn 
children). 
8In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) (in this case, the court ordered a pregnant 
woman to undergo a blood transfusion against her religious belief.  The court regarded the 
fetus as a human being, to whom the court stands in parens patriae and whom the court has an 
obligation to protect). 
9U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
10Id.  
11McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (this court said in 
dicta that “Our Society…has as its first principle, the respect for the individual, and that 
society and government exist to protect the individual from being invaded and hurt by 
another.”). 
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woman’s choice to refuse to submit to medical treatment must always be honored 
even where her choice may be harmful to her fetus.  A pregnant woman must be 
afforded the same rights as if she were not pregnant.  The decision must be hers and 
hers alone.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Motherhood Defined 
Motherhood is an enormously complicated term because of its emotional 
associations.  It is a symbol for the caring, nurturing, and sensitivity that women 
bring to a world that is full of conflicts.12  Motherhood has been interpreted as an 
instinct, a biological bond with a child, and an unyielding state of being that is the 
essence of female existence.13  It has also been construed as primarily a relationship 
that develops within a social, political, and historical context, that customarily 
requires women to give up and to give of themselves.14  
The potential relationship between a woman and her powers of reproduction was, 
in ancient motherhood, a power which compensated her for her powerlessness 
everywhere else.15  This power gave or withheld nourishment, warmth, or even 
survival itself.16  The idea of this maternal power has been domesticated under male 
control17 and as Adrienne Rich argues, “[I]n transfiguring and enslaving woman, the 
womb-the ultimate source of this power-has historically been turned against us and 
itself made into a source of powerlessness.”18  
This historical context of motherhood has developed into normative motherhood, 
which is a cultural expectation that all women should be mothers and that their 
subsequent behaviors accompany this expectation.19  Dominant cultural notions of 
motherhood give way to the idea and practice of controlling women with regard to 
gestation and childbirth.20  These subordinating social norms are being launched as 
legal duties, resulting in the regulation of pregnant women.21 
                                                                
12JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 29 (1993). 
13Id.  
14Id. at 38. 
15ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 67 
(1976). 
16Id. 
17From very ancient times the identity of the male depends on power, and specifically the 
control of others, including a woman and her children.  By controlling a mother, the male 
assures himself of the possession of his children.  See RICH, supra note 15, at 64. 
18RICH, supra note 15, at 68. 
19See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 30.  
20Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At The Intersection Of The Ideology 
Of Motherhood, The Practice Of Defaulting To Science, And The Interventionist Mindset Of 
Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1207 (1992).  
21Id. 
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Women who do not conform to these expectations are considered to be bad 
mothers and their noncompliance is assumed to be willful and immoral.22  This is 
problematic because women want to be in control of their own bodies.  Respect for 
people as moral agents to control their own bodies is the backbone to a liberal 
society.23  “The paradigm cases of such control consists of situations common to 
both men and women and those, like pregnancy, that are experienced only by women 
tend to be regarded as special cases and thrown into question.”24  The debate over 
these cases is usually innocuous when it involves only moral claims; however, when 
it moves into the legal sphere and leads to coercion or punishment, the implications 
become alarming.25 
Physicians may have a low tolerance for many patients’ refusals of medical 
treatment for what is considered to be low-risk invasive procedures, such as cesarean 
sections.26  The confusion that these physicians face when an apparently competent 
mother decides not to take a suggested course of action and consequently places her 
fetus at risk is quite understandable.27  However, the trepidation that the physician 
feels should not be the basis of his response, or that of the law, to a pregnant 
woman’s refusal of treatment.28 
B.  Fetal Rights Defined 
Historically, a fetus had almost no recognized legal existence before its birth 
because it was perceived, legally, as part of the woman.29  However, recent 
developments in medical technology have given rise to an established presence 
before birth.30 Physicians can now see the fetus, monitor it and check it for defects 
and imbalances.31 The ability to see and monitor the fetus as a “distinct entity” and 
the acknowledgment that the pregnant woman’s and fetus’ needs sometimes differ, 
have led physicians to consider the treatment to be of two patients rather than one.32  
                                                                
22Id. at 1306. 
23LAURA M. PURDY, REPRODUCING PERSONS 89 (1996). 
24Id. 
25Id.  See also V. Kolder, Women’s Health Law: A Feminist Perspective 1-2 (Aug. 1985) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at the HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.) (a pregnant Nigerian woman 
was strapped to the table for surgery while her husband was thrown out of the hospital).  See 
also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (a terminally ill cancer patient was forced to 
submit to a cesarean section to give her marginally viable fetus a chance at survival; both died 
within two days). 
26Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment Of Pregnant Women: ‘Compelling 
Each To Live As Seems Good To The Rest’  37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 713 (1986).  
27Id. 
28Id.  
29Katherine A. Knopoff, Can A Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 499, 501-02 (1991). 
30Id.  
31Id. 
32See ACOG, supra note 5.  
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In order to determine which patient’s interests should prevail, courts have analyzed 
whatever rights a fetus has against the rights of the competent pregnant woman.33  
The courts must first look at the moral status of the fetus and then to policies and 
Acts to determine what legal rights, if any, belong to the fetus. 
1.  The Moral Status of the Fetus 
The determination of the moral status of the fetus generally focuses on the 
question of whether the fetus is a “person.”34  If the fetus is a person, it has a right to 
exist.  Therefore, others would be morally obligated to take actions that have the 
potential of benefiting the fetus and to increase its prospects for life.35  This 
determination “is not made by scientific observation of facts.”36  It is a philosophical 
matter that involves debates about moral principles and issues.37  As a result, the 
moral status of a fetus is both controversial and unresolved.38 
Given that there is no consensus about whether a fetus is a “person” and the 
variety of plausible moral arguments about the status of the fetus, it seems that the 
resolution of maternal-fetal conflict should not be based on this ambiguous issue of 
the moral status of a fetus.39  A look into fetal protection policies may better define 
fetal rights. 
2.  Fetal Protection Policies 
Fetal protection policies are positions that are put into written form, and backed 
by the courts.40  These policies control, exclude, and marginalize women in the face 
of protecting fetal interests.41  Some of these policies have been found to be illegal.  
In United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the fetal protection practice of the employer that excluded “women with 
childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs” violated the Pregnancy 
                                                                
33In re Fetus Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d 159 (1997).  (The appellate Court held that a 
woman’s right to refuse medical treatment involving religiously offensive blood transfusions 
outweighed the State’s interest in protecting the viable fetus).  See also In re Jamaica Hosp., 
491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (the Court ordered a life-saving transfusion since the State had a highly 
significant interest in protecting the life of the fetus, which outweighs the patient’s right to 
refuse).  See also Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 
1981) (“[t]he Court finds that the intrusion involved into the life of Jessie Mae Jefferson and 
her husband…is outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human 
being…”). 
34See Nelson, supra note 26, at 714.  
35Id.   
36Id.  
37Id.  
38Id. at 715. 
39See Nelson, supra note 26, at 715. It is reasonable to argue that a fetus has human value 
and significance. It is also reasonable to argue that the recently fertilized egg is simply not the 
equivalent of a live born human.  
40Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1281-82.  
41Id. at 1282. 
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Discrimination Act of Title VII.42  The Court stated that decisions that affect the 
welfare of any future children are to be left to the parents who “conceive, bear, 
support, and raise them,” not the employer who hires the parents.43  Nevertheless, 
these illegal protection policies are limited to employers covered by Title VII,44 and 
those employers may, instead, provide women with  “counseling and education” 
concerning certain health risks.45  The point is that this provision of counseling and 
education could become coercive, thus allowing these illegal protection policies to 
survive.46 
It is argued that the often unarticulated bases of these fetal protection policies 
assume that women should not make decisions concerning their own bodies and that 
fetal interests are superior to those of women.47  Lisa Ikemoto argues that the bases 
of these policies “assume that women cannot and should not make decisions for 
themselves.”48  This attitude has historically set the tone for the rights of pregnant 
women,49 and it reinforces the patriarchal control of maternal power.50 
3.  Fetal Rights Acts 
There have been attempts made to pass fetal rights legislation at the federal level.  
During the last two decades, a number of “Human Life Bills” have been 
introduced.51  For example, in 1981, there were proposed regulations “[t]o provide 
that human life shall be deemed to exist from conception,”52 and a resolution 
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States protecting unborn 
                                                                
42111 S.Ct. 1196, 1198 (1991).  
43Id. at 1207. 
4442 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 
twenty or more calendar weeks…but such term does not include (1) the United States, a 
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States.…” 
45United Auto Workers, 111 S. Ct. at 1196 (1991).   
46In March 1991, two waiters were fired after refusing to serve alcohol to a pregnant 
woman.  The waiters received national attention and they became local heros for their stand. 
Barbara Kantrowits, et al., The Pregnancy Police, NEWSWEEK, April 29, 1991, at 52. 
47Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1282.  
48Id.  
49Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (This case is characterized as the worst of legal 
arguments in terms of equality of treatment of women because the Court focused on the 
woman’s procreative functions.  The Court stated that “the physical well being of woman 
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the 
race”). 
50See RICH, supra note 15, at 67.  
51S. 158, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981) (introduced by Sen. Jesse Helms) (providing that 
unborn children are considered “persons” for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment right 
to life); S. 1741, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981) (providing that life begins at conception); H.R. 
900, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981) (deeming that human life begins at conception). 
52H.R. 900, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981). 
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children.53  In 1985, a bill was proposed to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54  
These bills were clearly attempts to restrict women’s rights to abortions.55  If a bill of 
this magnitude were enacted today, it would introduce a range of restrictions on a 
woman’s reproductive autonomy that could potentially regulate her completely.  It 
would produce justification for physicians and the courts to subordinate the interests 
of pregnant women over the interests of their fetus’. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS 
Research in medicine continues to reveal more and more ways in which a baby’s 
health can be jeopardized by the conduct of a woman during pregnancy.  As our 
knowledge of prevention and prenatal harm grows, so too has public pressure to 
change the behavior of non-compliant pregnant women.  Well-intentioned physicians 
and others concerned with the interests of pregnant women and their fetuses often 
disagree over the ethical duties owed to both the woman and the fetus.  These issues 
can be analyzed from several perspectives.   
The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists (hereinafter “ACOG”) 
has enunciated ethical analysis of certain bioethical problems.  Although it treats 
pregnant women as two patients, its report notes that a resort to the court to compel 
treatment is almost never justified.56 
A 1990 report in the Journal of The American Medical Association was based on 
the deliberations of the ACOG committee of medicolegal problems.57  The American 
Medical Association (hereinafter “AMA”) discourages resorting to the court, but 
acknowledges that some maternal fetal conflicts may require judicial intervention.58  
And finally, an analysis of the legal position on the ethical problem of maternal fetal 
conflicts is necessary because sometimes these conflicts progress from the hospital to 
the court. 
A.  The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Position  
on Maternal-Fetal Rights 
A physician generally has four choices when a pregnant woman refuses 
recommended medical treatment.59  First, the physician can terminate the physician-
patient relationship with the pregnant woman.60 This choice seems morally 
acceptable only if the woman is able to find medical care elsewhere.  Second, the 
physician can try to convince the pregnant woman to follow the recommended 
                                                                
53H.R.J. Res. 62, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981). 
54S. 522, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985).  
55See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1284. 
56See ACOG, supra note 5, at 2 (see comment at note 5). 
57Joelyn Knopf Levy, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pregnancy, and Blood Transfusions: A 
Paradigm For The Autonomy Rights Of All Pregnant Women, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 171 
(1999). 
58See Levy, supra note 57, at 177. 
59See ACOG, supra note 5, at 2. 
60Id.  
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treatment.61  The physician must be careful when selecting this choice because if the 
persuasion turns to coercion, it becomes dangerously unethical.  The third choice that 
a physician may select is to seek a court order to compel the pregnant woman to 
submit to the recommended medical treatment.62  This is the choice that the ACOG 
strongly recommends that the physician avoid.63  The fourth and final choice is for 
the physician to respect the pregnant woman’s decision and the principle of 
autonomy.64  This choice appears to be the recommended choice of  ACOG65 and 
probably the hardest one for most physicians to accept.  Physicians may have a low 
tolerance for a pregnant woman refusing treatment that may be beneficial to her 
fetus, yet the physician-patient relationship is based on trust and respect.  ACOG 
makes clear that in balancing maternal-fetal conflict, the physician should put more 
weight on the autonomy of the pregnant woman and honor her refusal of treatment.66 
In 1987, the ACOG Committee on Ethics issued an opinion entitled “Patient 
Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict.”67  The Committee’s opinion states that “the 
obstetrician should be concerned with the health care of both the pregnant woman 
and the fetus within her, assessing the attendant risks and benefits to each during the 
course of care.”68  However, the opinion makes quite clear that an obstetrician’s 
concern for the health care of both patients should be apparent by “present[ing] a 
balanced evaluation of maternal and fetal expectations.”69  The Committee went on 
to say that this concern should not involve coercive action “to obtain consent or force 
a course of action,” and that an obstetrician should be cognizant of the principles of 
autonomy and physician-patient relationship.70 
The ACOG Committee on Ethics further asserted what an obstetrician’s 
obligations are in order to promote these principles.  The Committee stated that when 
a pregnant woman refuses recommended treatment that would be beneficial to her 
fetus’ health, an obstetrician should urge the woman to consult with other 
physicians.71  It went on to suggest that an ethics committee would be the best source 
of arbitration for any further conflict, rather than the judiciary, based on the 
“destructive effect of court orders on the pregnant woman’s autonomy and on the 
physician-patient relationship.”72 
                                                                
61Id.  
62Id.  
63Id. 
64See ACOG, supra note 5, at 2. 
65Id.  
66Id. 
67Levy, supra note 57, at 176; see also ACOG, supra note 5.  
68See ACOG, supra note 5, at 1. 
69Id. at 2. 
70Id. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
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B.  The American Medical Association’s Position on Maternal-Fetal Rights 
A 1990 report in the Journal of the American Medical Association contained 
findings similar to that of the ACOG in that they discourage judicial intervention in 
cases of maternal-fetal conflict.73 The report finds that the physician’s ethical duty is 
to act in the best interest of the fetus as well as the woman.74  In doing so, the 
physician must balance the interests of both the fetus and the woman bearing in mind 
that in no other situation is it appropriate for a physician to require a patient to 
sacrifice on behalf of another.75 The AMA concluded that the circumstances of 
maternal-fetal conflict are no different.76 
The AMA report lists several reasons why it does not recommend physicians to 
seek judicial intervention to compel pregnant women to submit to recommended 
medical treatment.77  First, the AMA is of the opinion that courts are not the 
appropriate forum to resolve medical treatment debates.78  A quick decision is 
usually necessary in these obstetric cases; therefore, the judge, who is in most cases 
not a medical expert and must rely on the professional opinion of the physician 
seeking the order, is asked to make a speedy and informed decision.79  Also, the 
pregnant woman is not in the best position because she is given very little time to 
prepare a defense of her autonomy.80 
Secondly, the report finds that the cases that are selected for a court order are 
based on the physician’s individual opinion of compelled medical treatment; which 
is an inconsistent application of the law.81  
Third, the physician is under no legal obligation to seek a court order to compel a 
pregnant woman’s submission to the recommended treatment, even if the woman’s 
refusal puts the fetus’ life in danger.82 
Finally, the AMA’s report notes that when a physician requests court 
intervention, he/she interferes with the physician-patient relationship.83  This creates 
an adversarial relationship which may discourage women from seeking medical 
                                                                
73See Levy, supra note 57, at 177; see also In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 Ill. App. (1994) (the 
AMA states that a physician’s duty “is not to dictate the pregnant woman’s decision, but to 
ensure that she is provided with the appropriate information to make an informed decision”). 
74H. M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments 
and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA, 2663, 
2664 (1990). 
75Id. at 2664. 
76Id. 
77Id.  
78Id. at 2665. 
79See Cole, supra note 74, at 2665. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. at 2666. 
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care.84  In conclusion, the AMA report, similar to the ACOG committee opinion, 
recommends that physicians be mindful of a pregnant woman’s autonomy and, 
except under “exceptional circumstances,” a physician should refrain from seeking 
judicial intervention.85 
Thus, physicians are motivated to seek court orders to force pregnant women to 
submit to recommended medical treatments, not out of a legal duty or an obligation 
imposed upon them by the AMA or the ACOG, but rather out of a moral belief that 
is based on the normative ideology of motherhood discussed above.86  In balancing 
the interests of both of their patients, physicians must mediate their relationship to 
the fetus by the woman in whose body it resides. 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ISSUES 
When a judge is called upon to rule on whether a pregnant woman should be 
compelled to submit to recommended medical treatment he is to draw his 
conclusions from consecrated principles.87  A judge may base his decision on 
constitutional grounds,88 case law,89 or statutory law.  In drawing his conclusion, a 
judge must bear in mind that these cases possess great symbolic and precedential 
significance on the legal status of women.90  A conclusion in favor of the compelled 
medical treatment of a pregnant woman may reinforce societal stereotypes of 
pregnant women as being incompetent to make moral decisions.91  It may also 
legitimatize a forceful assertion of physicians’ control over pregnancy and 
childbirth.92  A judge must, therefore, be wary of enforcing a medical model that 
would interfere with a decision that should be a private, family decision. 
A.  The Legal Position on Maternal-Fetal Rights 
Courts are split on the issue of compelling a pregnant woman to submit to 
recommended medical treatment for the benefit of her fetus.  In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul 
Morgan Memorial Hospital,93 the court compelled a woman to submit to a blood 
                                                                
84See Cole, supra note 74, at 2665. 
85Id. at 2666 (AMA report notes that “exceptional circumstances” encompass refusals of 
blood transfusions because a transfusion poses little risk to the woman, is minimally invasive, 
and in most cases has the potential to save the fetus’s life). 
86See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 47-50. 
87George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut Of All, 12 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 16 (1982) (quoting Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown 
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1010). 
88Id.  
89Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457. 
90Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong With Fetal Rights, 
10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 47 (citing Flanigan, Fleeing the Law: A Matter of Faith, DET. FREE 
PRESS, June 29, 1982, at 3A; Flanigan, Mom Follows Belief, Gives Birth In Hiding, DET. FREE 
PRESS, June 28, 1982, at 3A.  
91Id. 
92Id. 
93201 A.2d 537 (1964). 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
144 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:133 
transfusion to save the viable fetus that she was carrying.94  The court reasoned that 
“the unborn…[are] entitled to the law’s protection.”95  This reasoning was based on 
the court’s earlier holding in State v. Perricone96 which held that “the State’s concern 
for the welfare of an infant justified blood transfusions.”97  The court in Raleigh 
failed to consider the woman’s rights as a Jehovah’s Witness to refuse a blood 
transfusion because “the welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and 
inseperable that it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them 
with respect to the sundry factual patterns….”98 
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,99 the earliest reported 
opinion involving a pregnant woman’s right to refuse a cesarean section, the court 
authorized a cesarean section that was refused by a woman for religious reasons.100  
The court held that “because the life of defendant and of the unborn child are … 
inseparable, the Court deems it appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the mother 
to the extent necessary to give the child an opportunity to live.”101  The court went on 
to find that the intrusion into the life of the woman is outweighed by the State’s duty 
to protect the fetus.102  The court’s only legal basis for this finding is Roe v. Wade,103 
which the court characterized as “prohibiting the arbitrary termination of the life of 
an unborn fetus.”104  However, the Roe court did not find that the State has an interest 
in a fetus sufficient to compel a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment 
against her will.105 
Other courts have honored the woman’s right to refuse recommended medical 
treatment.  In In re Baby Boy Doe,106 the court held that a competent woman’s choice 
to refuse to undergo a cesarean section must be honored, even where her choice may 
be harmful to her fetus.107  The court went on to find that there should be no 
balancing of maternal-fetal interests and that a woman’s choice to refuse medical 
treatment as invasive as a cesarean section must be honored.108  The majority also 
                                                                
94Id. 
95Id. at 423. 
96181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962). 
97Id. 
98201 A.2d 537 (1964). 
99274 S.E.2d at 457. 
100Id.  
101Id. at 458. 
102Id. at 460. 
103410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
104Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d 457. 
105See Levy, supra note 57, at 181; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, 157. 
106632 N.E.2d 326. 
107Id.  
108Id. 
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suggested that an order compelling a pregnant woman to undergo an invasive 
procedure would violate her constitutional rights.109 
In Taft v. Taft,110 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts vacated the lower 
court’s ruling and found that the defendant wife could not be ordered to submit to a 
cerlage or “purse string” operation to hold the pregnancy.111  Justice Wilkins 
reasoned that the woman has a constitutional right to privacy and that the State failed 
to show circumstances so compelling as to justify the invasion of this right.112  The 
justices further reasoned that no case was cited to them, nor have they found one, in 
which a court ordered a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment to benefit a 
fetus not then viable.113 
Thus, there are two approaches the courts use when deciding to honor a woman’s 
refusal to submit to recommended medical treatment.  One is an “absolute approach” 
that gives the pregnant woman an absolute right to refuse treatment.  The other is a 
“balancing approach” or test, where the court weighs the interests of the woman and 
the fetus and concludes that the woman’s interest outweighs that of her fetus.  In 
using the balancing test, the courts usually base their conclusion on the constitutional 
rights of the woman. 
B.  Constitutional Issues 
When courts honor a pregnant woman’s right to refuse recommended medical 
treatment they do so based on several fundamental rights that are granted in the 
United States Constitution.114  First, they recognize the fundamental right to refuse 
medical treatment that is accorded to all competent adults.115  Second, they recognize 
an individual’s right of privacy which is implicitly granted in the Fourth 
Amendment.116  Finally, they also recognize the First Amendment freedom of 
religion as a fundamental right in determining one’s destiny.117 
1.  The Right of Privacy 
The United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to bodily integrity.  
A number of courts have expressly recognized this constitutional right of privacy.118  
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, stated: 
                                                                
109Id. at 394. 
110446 N.E.2d at 395. 
111Id. at 396. 
112Id. at 397. 
113Id. 
114Rebekah R. Arch, R.N., The Maternal-Fetal Rights Dilemma: Honoring A Woman’s 
Choice Of Medical Care During Pregnancy, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 637, 659 
(1996) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).  
115Id. 
116Id.  See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
117See Arch, supra note 114, at 657; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
118See Nelson, supra note 26, at 747.  
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[A]rising from the same regard for human dignity and self-determination, 
it is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy….  As this constitutional 
guaranty reaches out to protect the freedom of a woman to terminate her 
pregnancy under certain conditions…, so it encompasses the right of a 
patient to preserve his or her right to privacy against unwanted 
infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances.119 
The United States Constitution implicitly grants this right of privacy in the 
Fourth Amendment.120  The function of the Fourth Amendment “is to protect 
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”121  The 
Fourth Amendment also protects the expectations of individuals that in certain 
places, and at certain times, they have, the right to be left alone; and this is one of the 
most valued rights an individual has.  A pregnant woman has just as strong an 
interest in protecting her bodily integrity as a non-pregnant woman, and the 
constitutional guaranty of the right of privacy should reach her as well.  However, 
while the pregnant woman’s right of privacy is strong, the question that remains is 
whether it is strong enough to withstand the challenge of compelled medical 
treatment when the health of her fetus is at risk.122  
In In re Baby Doe, the Appellate Court of Illinois applied the Fourth 
Amendment’s guaranty of the right to privacy to pregnant women.123  The court held 
that a pregnant woman retains the same right to refuse medical treatment that she can 
exercise when she is not pregnant.124  In recognition of a pregnant woman’s rights, 
the court “explicitly rejected the view that the woman’s rights [could] be 
subordinated to fetal rights.”125  The court, in Doe, following the lead of the Illinois 
Supreme Court, went on to say that the “ ‘circumstances in which each individual 
woman brings forth life are as varied as the circumstances of each woman’s 
life,’…the court strongly suggested that there can be no consistent and objective 
legal standard by which to judge a woman’s actions during pregnancy.”126  Doe 
                                                                
119Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 
(1977)); see also Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984) (right of privacy 
guaranteed by the California Constitution, as well as by the United States Constitution); Satz 
v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (terminally ill competent adult patient 
has constitutional right to refuse of discontinue medical treatment), aff’d 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 
1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976) (decision to terminate vegetative existence by natural 
forces was valuable incident of right of privacy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
120U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
121Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1615-16 (1985) (surgical removal of bullet from 
suspect’s chest violated his fourth amendment rights).  
122See Nelson, supra note 26, at 749. 
123260 Ill. App. 3d at 392 (court held that in the context of compelled medical treatment of 
pregnant women, a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical treatment, derived from her 
rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy). 
124Id. at 392. 
125Id. at 401. 
126In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 400 (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist 125, Ill. 
2d. 267, 279 (1988) (Supreme Court refused to recognize tort action against a mother for 
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applied the rationale of Stallman127 and held that “a woman’s right to refuse invasive 
medical treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious 
liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy…and the potential impact upon the fetus 
is not legally relevant.”128 
2.  The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause 
Along with the right to privacy, the United States Constitution also provides for 
religious liberty.129  The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof….”130  The Supreme Court has identified two 
concepts embodied in the Free Exercise Clause; the right to religious belief, and the 
right to act in accordance with that religious belief.131  
The Court, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,132 reiterated this belief-action dichotomy 
and signaled a trend whereby certain religiously-motivated conduct was protected 
from governmental interference.133  In an opinion authored by Justice Roberts, a 
unanimous Court held that a Connecticut statute deprived Cantwell of his religious 
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.134  
In applying this belief-action dichotomy, the Supreme Court has noted that its 
case law respects a private realm of family into which the state cannot generally 
enter.135  However, the Court has also recognized that “the family itself is not beyond 
                                                          
unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries)); see also Family Lie League v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 
112 Ill. 2d 449 (1986) (Supreme Court of Illinois acknowledged that the state right of privacy 
protects substantive fundamental rights, such as the right to reproductive autonomy). 
127Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 267. 
128In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 401. 
129U.S CONST. amend I.  
130U.S CONST. amend I. By way of incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the 
First Amendment are fully applicable to the states.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940).  Therefore, state legislatures as well as Congress are prohibited from enacting laws 
that prohibit the free exercise of religion.  Id. at 303. 
131Laura M. Plastine, “In God We Trust”: When Parents Refuse Medical Treatment For 
Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 
126 (1993) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (while the court upheld 
the idea that religious beliefs are protected by the First Amendment, it allowed state regulation 
of religiously motivated conduct)). 
132310 U.S. 296.  
133Plastine, supra note 131, at 127 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296) (although Cantwell 
marked a victory for religious freedom, it was primarily decided on First Amendment free 
speech grounds.)  
134See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309. As previously noted, this landmark First Amendment 
case was the first to incorporate the provisions of the Free Exercise Clause into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See supra note 130. 
135See Arch, supra note 114, at 656. 
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regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.”136  According 
to the Court in Prince, there is a delicate balance between the exercise of parents’ 
freedom of control over their children and the exercise of state control over its’ 
citizens.137  The free exercise of religion may yield when the state has a compelling 
interest in the health and welfare of children under its protection.138 
Application of the parens patriae139 principle has been held not to violate the 
constitutional right to freedom of religion when the basis of parental objection to the 
medical treatment is based upon a religious belief.140  However, some courts, in 
applying this principle to cases involving pregnant women, have held that a pregnant 
woman and her fetus “are so intertwined…that it would be impracticable to attempt 
to distinguish between them….”141  Accordingly, the courts tip the balance in favor 
of the pregnant woman’s protected religious freedom.142  Therefore, since “a 
woman’s right to refuse invasive medical treatment, derived from her rights to 
privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished during 
pregnancy…and the potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant,” the 
courts must honor the pregnant woman’s wishes.143  
C.  Case Law 
The cases permitting the state to compel bodily intrusions do not strongly support 
the forced medical treatment of pregnant women for the welfare of their fetuses.  
Most of the cases supporting these intrusions are intended to benefit society as a 
whole,144 involve the sui generis145 circumstances of a prisoner under state custody,146 
                                                                
136Id. 
137Id. at 166-67.  
138Id.  See also Shannon K. Such, Lifesaving Medical Treatment For The Nonviable Fetus: 
Limitation On State Authority Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 969 n.48 (1986) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has upheld parents’ right to make decisions concerning their 
child’s welfare, however, this right is not absolute. Under the state’s parens patriae authority, 
court orders for certain forms of medical treatments for children against their parents’ wishes 
have been upheld).  
139Id.  See accompanying text.  
140Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145. 
141Raliegh, 201 A.2d at 538 (1964). 
142See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963).  
143See In re Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 392. 
144E.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).  
145Of its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own kind; peculiar.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1602 (4th ed. 1968).  
146See In Commissioner of Correction v. Myer, 379 Mass. 255 (1979) (the court held that a 
competent prisoner suffering from kidney disease could be compelled by the state to submit to 
hemodialysis despite his refusal of treatment, because the state’s interest in upholding orderly 
prison administration outweighed the prisoner’s interest). 
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or are very minor in nature.147 Many of the cases involving compelled medical 
treatment of pregnant women neither benefit society as a whole, nor affect any 
significant state interests.  More importantly, these compelled medical treatment 
cases involving pregnant women are not usually minor in nature. 
In Taft v. Taft,148 the court examined whether a husband could compel his wife to 
undergo a cerlage or “purse string” operation in order to hold her pregnancy.149  The 
pregnant woman refused this operation based on her religious beliefs.150  The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overturned a judgment ordering the 
pregnant woman to undergo the operation in order to hold her pregnancy.151  The 
court based a portion of its decision on the lack of facts in the record stating the 
nature of the risk to the pregnant woman.152  
In Jefferson, the Griffin Spalding County Hospital petitioned the Superior Court 
of Butts County for an order authorizing it to perform a cesarean section upon Mrs. 
Jefferson.153 The pregnant woman’s physician determined that Ms. Jefferson had 
placenta previa and that a c-section would be necessary to sustain the fetus’ life.154  
Ms. Jefferson and her husband both refused to consent to the surgery based upon 
their religious beliefs.155  Justice Smith, in his concurring opinion, stated that “such 
an intrusion by the state would be extraordinary, presenting some medical risks to 
both the mother and fetus.”156  
In both of these cases, the courts considered the nature of the risk of a cesarean 
section to the pregnant woman.  These cesarean sections involve surgery that is not 
minor in nature.157  During cesarean surgery the mother is under anesthesia and the 
surgery itself involves making incisions in the abdominal and uterine walls and then 
removing the infant.158  The risks involve infection, hemorrhage, and urinary tract 
                                                                
147United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (removal of bullet lying 
superficially beneath skin did not involve any harm or risk). 
148446 N.E.2d at 395 (a cerlage or “purse string” operation is one in which the cervix is 
sewn closed to prevent miscarriage). 
149Id.  
150Id.  
151Id.  
152Id.  
153Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457. 
154Id.  Placenta previa is a condition in which the placenta grows over the opening of the 
birth canal. JACK PRITCHARD ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 3 (17th ed. 1985). 
155Id.  
156He went on to add that the circumstances of this case show that the mother’s chance of 
survival without the cesarean section would be no better than fifty percent. Based on this fact, 
and medical evidence that shows the risk of a cesarean section to be well below fifty percent, 
Smith agreed with the majority and concluded that the order did not violate Mrs. Jefferson’s 
First Amendment rights. 
157Joel Jay Finer, Toward Guidelines For Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of Rights, 
Responsibility, And Decisional Authenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 275 (1991).  
158Id.  
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injury; and these risks are higher among women who undergo cesarean sections in 
emergency situations.159  Because these involuntary cesareans are not minor in nature 
and can pose health risks to the pregnant woman, courts should refrain from 
compelling a pregnant woman to submit to such a bodily invasion. 
D.  Statutory Law 
No state has a statute that expressly grants any court jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning a pregnant woman’s refusal to submit to physician recommended 
medical treatment when the refusal may compromise the health and welfare of her 
fetus.  All states, however, do have statutes that prohibit child abuse and neglect.160 
Physical abuse has been defined as “[p]hysical injury to a child, including 
deliberate poisoning where there is a definite knowledge, or a suspicion, that the 
injury was inflicted or knowingly not prevented.”161  This abuse has also been 
defined as “violence and other nonaccidental, proscribed human actions that inflict 
pain on a child and are capable of causing injury or permanent impairment to 
developing or functioning.”162 
Child neglect has been defined as “parents’ or caretakers’ failure to provide basic 
physical health care, supervision, nutrition…”;163 “the persistent or severe neglect of 
a child (for example, by exposure to any kind of danger…) which results in serious 
impairment of the child’s health or development…”;164 and “the deprivation or 
nonprovision of necessary and societally available resources due to proximate and 
proscribed human actions that create the risk of permanent impairment to 
development of functioning.”165 
The definitions of child abuse and neglect vary among states,166 and all states 
have statutes authorizing the state to assume control of a minor whose parents or 
guardian have endangered the minor’s health and welfare.167  These statutes allowing 
                                                                
159Id.  
160Sanford Katz et al., Child Neglect Laws In America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975) (includes a 
list and analysis of these statutes). 
161Sana Loue, Legal And Epidemiological Aspects Of Child Maltreatment, 19 J. LEGAL 
MED. 471 (quoting S. CREIGHTON, CHILD ABUSE TRENDS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1988-1990: 
AN OVERVIEW FROM 1973-1990 (1992)). 
162Id. (quoting David Finkelhor & Jill Korbin, Child Abuse as a International Issue, 12 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 3, 4 (1998)). 
163Id. (quoting James Gaudin, Effective Intervention with Neglectful Families, 20 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 66, 67 (1993). 
164See Loue, supra note 161, and accompanying text. 
165Id. 
166See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986) (“general neglect defined 
as failure of parent for parent to make an informed and appropriate medical decision regarding 
a child’s care after consultation with a physician who has examined the child”); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 201.090(3) (1983) (neglected child is any person under eighteen years of age not 
provided with the necessities of life by its parents). 
167See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-
11 (West 1981). 
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the state to assume control of an endangered minor have become the jurisdictional 
basis for judicial orders compelling a pregnant woman to submit to medical 
treatment for the health and welfare of her fetus.168 
The question with respect to these child neglect statutes as the jurisdictional basis 
for judicial action in cases of maternal-fetal conflict is whether the fetus is a “child” 
within the meaning of the statute.  There is only one state that has a child neglect 
statute that expressly defines “child” to include a fetus.169  This lack of expression 
suggests that legislators were not considering fetuses when they drafted child neglect 
laws.170 
Two appellate courts have relied on this apparent lack of legislative intent to 
conclude that fetuses are not within the scope of child neglect statutes.  In In re 
Steven S.,171 a California court of appeal held that a fetus is not a “person” within the 
meaning of the statute that confers jurisdiction on the juvenile court to adjudge any 
“person under the age of 18 years” a dependent of the court on specified grounds.172 
In this case, the mother was in the process of challenging her confinement to a 
mental hospital when the county sought to have her fetus declared a dependent 
child.173  The juvenile court ordered the fetus, and hence the mother, detained 
pending its adjudication on the merits of the dependent child petition.174  The 
juvenile court sustained the petition and the mother gave birth during confinement.175 
The Court of Appeal of California reversed and held that previous decisions had 
not found fetuses to be “persons” within the meaning of child neglect statutes and 
that when the legislature intended statutes to include fetuses, it expressly said so.176 
The court also disapproved of the juvenile court’s proceeding to detain the mother 
for two months that resulted in the child being born in confinement and placed in a 
foster home. 177 
                                                                
168Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458; In re Unborn Baby Wilson, No. 81-108 AV (Calhoun 
County P. Ct. Feb. 3, 1981).  Watson Bowes & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: 
Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209-10 (1981).  
169N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981). 
170See Nelson, supra note 26 (citing Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the 
State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1984)).  
171126 Cal. App. 3d 23 (1981). 
172Id. at 28-30; see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986) (“Any person 
under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the 
court:…Who is in need of proper  and effective parental care or control.”).  Section 300 has 
been used as a jurisdictional cases for the state’s challenge to a parent’s refusal to consent to 
medical treatment of a child.  In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796 (1979).  
173In re Stevens, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 23. 
174Id. 
175Id.  
176Id.  In an influential decision that preceded In re Steven S., the California Supreme 
Court held that a fetus was not a “person” within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. 
Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564 (1977). 
177In re Stevens, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 30-31.  
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Similarly, in In re Dittrick Infant, a Michigan court of appeals held that fetuses 
did not fall within the meaning of the state juvenile code.178  In that case, a woman 
became pregnant while she had a pending proceeding against her for abuse of her 
children.179  The probate court granted custody to a state agency pursuant to the 
juvenile code.180  The appellate court reversed and held that the word “child” could 
be read as applying to unborn persons.  However, it concluded “that the legislature 
did not intend application of these provisions to unborn children.”181  
In contrast, some courts may find that the child abuse statutes do provide a 
jurisdictional basis for a petition seeking to compel a pregnant woman to submit to 
medical treatment, depending on the court’s interpretation of the law to fetuses.  This 
is extremely problematic because it is most likely that legislative intent was not to 
include fetuses in the abuse statutes based on the critical difference between a fetus 
and a live-born child.  In order to address the abuse of the former, the state must 
invade the body and liberty of the mother. 
V.  CONTROL OF PREGNANCY 
In the past decade, the state has begun to reinforce the idea that a pregnant 
woman should conform to particular behaviors in order to protect the health and 
welfare of her fetus.182  These controls have taken two forms.  First, there are direct 
regulations of pregnancy which deny the woman a possibility of choice.183  These 
direct regulations are usually imposed by the state through the patient-physician 
relationship.184  The second category of pregnancy control regulations is indirect 
regulations which suggest that a woman may have a choice; however, a wrong 
choice may result in legal penalties.185 
                                                                
17880 Mich. App. 219 (1977). 
179Id. 
180Id.  
181Id. 
182See Raleigh, 201 A.2d at 537 (the Supreme Court held that the fetus was entitled to the 
law’s protection, and an appropriate order would be issued to force the mother to submit to a 
blood transfusion).  See In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (the mother of ten children was 
ordered to submit to a life-saving blood transfusion in order to protect her fetus).  See 
Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (the Court authorized the plaintiff hospital to administer to 
defendant (thirty nine week pregnant woman) “all medical procedures deemed necessary by 
the attending physician to preserve the life of defendant’s unborn child”). 
183Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1235. 
184Id.  
185Id.  See also Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).  Jennifer 
Johnson, an addict who took cocaine while pregnant, was prosecuted for delivering a 
controlled substance to a minor after the birth of her daughter.  The Prosecutor’s theory was 
that Johnson had delivered this cocaine to her child between the time the child emerged from 
the birth canal and the time the umbilical cord was severed (statute did not define a fetus as a 
minor). 
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A.  Direct Control 
Direct control of a pregnancy involves the steps that a state takes to enforce a 
physician’s prescribed medical treatment despite the woman’s refusal of such 
treatment.186  Consent is the key issue in this regulation.187  Ordinarily, a physician 
may not act without the informed consent of the patient.188  Without this consent 
from a pregnant woman, a physician may feel morally compelled to seek a court 
order to avoid harm to the fetus.189  A state directly regulates a pregnant woman 
when a judge steps in and issues an order compelling the woman to a treatment 
prescribed by her physician. 
Court orders have been sought for forced cesarean sections,190 forced prenatal 
treatment in the form of blood transfusions and cerlage or “purse string” surgery,191 
forced hospital deliveries,192 and there is a threat of future court orders involving 
forced fetal surgery.193 
1.  Forced Prenatal Treatment 
Courts have proven persistence in their willingness to step in and directly 
regulate pregnant women.  “In a national 1987 survey, Kolder, Gallagher, and 
Parsons found that court orders had been obtained for cesarean sections in ten states, 
for hospital detentions in two states, and for intrauterine transfusions in one state.”194  
Among these cases, the court orders obtained were received within six hours.195 
                                                                
186See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1236. 
187See LEVINE, supra note 4. 
188See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
189See Nelson, supra note 26, at 721.  
190In re Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 392 (action brought to compel pregnant woman 
to submit to cesarean section). 
191In re Fetus Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 159 (the State filed a “Petition on Hearing on 
whether a temporary custodian can be appointed to consent to a blood transfusion”).  A 
cerlage or “purse string” surgery is where suturing is involved so that the cevix can hold the 
pregnancy.  See also Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 395 (husband sought a court order to force his four 
month pregnant wife to have her cervix sewn closed to prevent a possible miscarriage).  
192See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (hospital petitioned the Superior Court for an order 
authorizing it to perform a caesarean section and any necessary blood transfusions upon 
pregnant woman before labor begins, which would necessitate a forced hospital delivery).  
193Krista L. Newkirk, Note, State Compelled Fetal Surgery: The Viability Test Is Not 
Viable, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 467, 470 (1998).  There are no cases to date on forced 
fetal surgery.  However, as the procedure becomes more available and less experimental, we 
can expect to see a case presenting the issue of compelled fetal surgery arise in the courts. 
194Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1248 (citing Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court Ordered 
Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987).  The number of states that 
court orders have been sought in for transfusions has increased since the date of the survey.  
See In re Fetus Brown, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 159.  
195See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1248. 
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In re Jamaica Hospital, is a case that describes how these court orders are 
recurrently met.196  The New York trial court ordered the life-saving blood 
transfusion where a woman who was eighteen weeks pregnant refused on religious 
grounds.197  Judge Lonschein’s opinion describes the eighteen-week old fetus as “a 
potentially viable human being in a life threatening situation.”198  It also describes the 
fetus as “a human being, to whom the court stands in parens patriae.”199  The court 
went on to say that the state has a “highly significant interest in protecting the life of 
a midterm fetus,” and this outweighs the woman’s right to refuse the transfusion.200  
A pregnant woman’s right to refuse treatment was also found not to outweigh the 
rights of her fetus at the trial court level in Taft v. Taft.201  In this case, the trial court 
ordered a cerlage or “purse string” operation202 to be performed on a pregnant 
woman carrying a four-month old fetus.203  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court vacated the judgment because the pregnant woman’s constitutional rights had 
been established on record and any interest that the state might have had was not 
established.204  This opinion implies that the state’s interest might have been 
established if the record had contained more facts. 
These cases have consistently subordinated the interests of the pregnant woman 
in order to protect the fetus, and the efforts to protect the fetus in these cases, as well 
as others,205 have often proved pointless.  What seems clear is that these women are 
being viewed by physicians, as well as judges, as violating the ideology of 
motherhood206 because they fail to act selflessly to protect their fetus. 
2.  Forced Cesarean Sections 
In some instances, judges have felt it necessary to step into the delivery room and 
order cesarean sections against the wishes of pregnant women.  Since time is of the 
essence in these circumstances, a judge is usually summoned to the hospital to talk to 
the physician and the woman.  Judges are not always good at making these 
emergency decisions. 
                                                                
196In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 898. 
197Id. at 900.  
198See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at1249 (quoting In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899).  
199Id. (quoting In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900).  
200Id. 
201Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 395. 
202See supra note 160 (accompanying text). 
203See Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 395. 
204Id. 
205See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1235 (both mother and fetus died within two days of the 
court ordered ceasarean section); see also Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (mother uneventfully 
delivered a healthy baby without surgical intervention before the Supreme Court ruled on the 
parents petition to stay the lower courts order for a cesarean section). 
206See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 38.  
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A famous example is Judge Skelly Wright’s opinion in the Application of the 
President & Directors of Georgetown College.207  In this case, Judge Wright, a 
circuit court judge, issued an order for an emergency blood transfusion after a lower 
court judge refused.208  The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review the case.  
However, several members dissented from the refusal and voiced their concerns 
noting that Judge Wright was: 
Impelled, I am sure, by humanitarian impulses and doubtless was himself 
under considerable strain…In the interval of about an hour and twenty 
minutes between the appearance of the attorney at his chambers and the 
signing of the order at the hospital, the judge had no opportunity for 
research as to the substantive legal problems and procedural questions 
involved.  He should not have been asked to act in these circumstances.209 
This lack of reflection is apparent in two other cases where the courts held that a 
woman can be forced to undergo a cesarean section if her physician recommends it 
to safeguard the fetus.210  Both of these cases were decided just hours after they were 
argued and neither court analyzed the rights of the pregnant women.211  These forced 
cesarean cases are similar to the forced blood transfusion cases in that fetal rights are 
given preference over those of the woman.  The physicians and judges are imprinting 
their interpretation of motherhood into their decisions. 
This restriction of choice is inappropriate because it is unsuitable for a judge to 
act impetuously, without benefit of reflection on past precedent.212  Warren Burger, 
former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court quoted Justice Cardozo on judicial 
restraint: 
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.  He is not to 
innovate at pleasure.  He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit 
of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness.  He is to draw his inspiration 
from consecrated principles.  He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to 
vague and unregulated benevolence.213 
Since the delivery room is not conducive to such reflection, judges do not belong 
there at all under these circumstances. 
3.  Forced Hospital Deliveries 
Although there are no laws requiring that all births take place in a hospital, courts 
have ordered hospital deliveries for what physicians diagnose as high-risk 
pregnancies.  In Jefferson, the Georgia Superior Court granted temporary custody of 
the fetus to the State of Georgia Department of Human Resources to ensure that 
                                                                
207331 F. 2d at 1000 (1964).  
208Id.  
209See Annas, supra note 87, at 16. 
210See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457. 
211See Annas, supra note 87, at 16. 
212Id. 
213Id. at 17. 
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Jessie Mae Jefferson would deliver in the hospital.214  Nevertheless, Ms. Jefferson 
delivered a healthy baby without state intervention while awaiting the Supreme 
Court to rule on the petition that was filed to vacate the judgment of the lower 
court.215  In a Michigan case, the judge ordered a pregnant woman to admit herself to 
the hospital by a specific time and date and to submit herself to whatever medical 
treatment was deemed necessary by the medical personnel, including a cesarean 
section.216  If the woman failed to follow this order, she was told that she would be 
picked up and taken to the hospital by the local police.217  Instead, the pregnant 
woman went into hiding and delivered a healthy baby by vaginal birth.218 
This principle of maternal subordination is spoken of as if it were natural and 
rational,219 and yet these cases reiterate the actuality that intervention often occurs 
with no specific evidence of necessity.  The possibility that women can control their 
own pregnancies is disappearing because the increasing weightiness of fetal interests 
seems to be enforcing maternal subordination. 
4.  Forced Fetal Surgery 
In 1981, doctors performed the first surgery on a fetus.220  The surgery involved 
passing a needle through the woman’s abdomen to repair her fetus’ blocked urinary 
tract.221  In 1989, University of California physicians successfully performed the first 
major surgery on a fetus outside of the womb.222  The physicians partially removed 
the fetus from the womb, repaired a herniated diaphragm, and then returned it to the 
womb.223 
Even though these techniques are presently in the experimental stage, there may 
soon be a great demand for such surgery once it becomes readily accessible.224  Once 
these surgeries become more readily available and less experimental, one can expect 
to see a case of compelled fetal surgery come before the court.225 
The current principle of direct control of pregnant women may greatly impact 
future courts addressing the issue of fetal surgery.  The unsettled case law regarding 
                                                                
214Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 459. 
215Id. 
216See Gallagher, supra note 90.  
217Id. 
218Id. 
219See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 29. 
220Sharon Begley, The Tiniest Patients, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 1990, at 56. 
221Id. 
222Andrew Purvis, Major Surgery Before Birth, TIME, June 11, 1990, at 55. 
223Id. 
224See Marguerite Holloway, Fetal Law: Experimental Surgery May Feed Ethical 
Debates, SCI. AM., Sept. 1990, at 46 (noting that fetal surgery may become common, 
especially because “most women would do anything for the health of their fetus, despite the 
risk”). 
225See Newkirk, supra note 193. 
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court-ordered medical treatment to protect a fetus may indicate the possibility of 
compelling pregnant women to submit to unwanted fetal surgeries.226  The pregnant 
woman’s right to be free from coercion in making reproductive decisions is once 
again at stake with this rapidly advancing technology.227 
B.  Indirect Control 
The second category of pregnancy regulations is indirect control.  This category 
differs from direct control in that it suggests that a woman has a choice.  However, a 
wrong choice may result in legal penalties.228 The indirect control of pregnant 
women is not through medical interventions, but this type of regulation does 
continue the cultural practice of requiring self-sacrifice as defined by the ideology of 
motherhood.229 This indirect control is seen primarily in terms of tort liability,230 
criminal prosecutions,231 and findings of child neglect or abuse based on a mother’s 
conduct during pregnancy.232 
1.  Tort Liability 
Since 1946, courts have acknowledged tort actions brought by children for 
prenatal injuries caused by third parties.233  Some courts have abolished the Prenatal 
Immunity Doctrine,234 allowing children to bring a tort action against their parents as 
well as third parties.235  It is becoming more likely that a child could recover against 
his or her parents for injuries caused by conception or for harms occurring during 
pregnancy.236 
In Grodin, Randy Grodin brought a tort action against his mother for taking 
tetracycline during her pregnancy.237  Randy’s teeth were discolored because his 
                                                                
226David C. Blickenstaff, Defining The Boundaries Of Personal Privacy: Is There A 
Paternal Interest In Compelling Therapeutic Fetal Surgery?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1157 (1994).  
227See supra note 2. 
228Johnson, 578 So. 2d 419; see also Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1980). 
229See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 38.  
230See Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869. 
231See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1264-65 (noting criminal transmission of HIV and 
criminal prosecution of pregnant women who are addicts).  
232Id. at 1275 (noting child neglect and abuse laws). 
233Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (the first case allowing recovery for 
prebirth injury). 
234The doctrine emerged in three state court decisions, referred to as the ‘The Great 
Trilogy.’  Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983); see also Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 
885 (Miss. 1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903), overruled by, Davis v. 
Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), overruled by, 
Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952).  
235Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869.  
236See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1262. 
237See Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869.  
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mother took this antibiotic while pregnant with him.  The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Ms. Grodin.238  The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded the case back to the trial court to determine the reasonableness of Ms. 
Grodin taking tetracycline for her own benefit in light of the risk to her unborn 
fetus.239  The court’s focus was on the reasonableness of parental discretion.  This 
case strongly suggests that a woman is free to choose, but that her choice should not 
be a wrong choice.  She must weigh her benefits against any harm to her fetus.  
Another child plaintiff sued the laboratories that had failed to identify the parents 
as carriers of Tay-Sachs; subsequently the child was born with this disease.240  In 
dicta, the court said that if parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a 
pregnancy despite warnings that a seriously impaired child could be born, the choice 
would be an intervening act of proximate cause to preclude liability of other third 
party defendants.241  The court noted that they could see no public policy that would 
prevent those parents from being answerable for what they brought upon their 
child.242 
As this idea of maternal tort liability grows, a pregnant woman’s choices 
diminish and the state begins to play a role in her pregnancy.  These choices are 
coercive in nature, for the woman must always act first for her fetus or risk exposing 
herself to liability.  Fetal rights in tort would make a pregnant woman legally, as well 
as morally, responsible for her offspring’s health and welfare. 
2.  Criminal Prosecutions of Pregnant Women Who are Addicts  
A second indirect control of pregnant women is expressed in the utilization of 
criminal law.  Criminal prosecutions of pregnant women for acts which negatively 
affect their fetuses are another way for the state to domesticate maternal power and 
to reinforce the ideology of normative motherhood.243  This practice of controlling 
women with regard to gestation and childbirth is strongly expressed when criminal 
penalties are employed.  
Johnson v. State illustrates this indirect control.244  Ms. Johnson used cocaine 
during her two pregnancies.  Ms. Johnson admitted using cocaine the night before 
                                                                
238Id. at 870. 
239Id. at 871. 
240Curlender v. Dio-Science Labs, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).  
241Id. at 488. 
242Id.  In response to the dicta in Curlender, the California legislature enacted CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 43.6 (West 1981): 
No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim  
a) that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have 
been allowed to have been born alive. 
b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of his or her child shall 
not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall the failure or refusal be 
considered in awarding damages in any such action. 
c) As used in this section, “conceived” means the fertilization of a human ovum by 
a human sperm. 
243See RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 30. 
244Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 419. 
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her first child was born and while in labor with her second child.  Both births were 
normal and there were no signs of fetal distress.245 
Following the birth of her second child, Ms. Johnson was prosecuted.  The 
complaint stated that Ms. Johnson was guilty of delivering a controlled substance to 
a minor.  The prosecutor argued that Ms. Johnson delivered the cocaine to her 
children during the time between the child’s emergence from the birth canal and the 
severance of the umbilical cord.246  The court sentenced Ms. Johnson to fifteen 
years.247  In 1992, the Supreme Court of Florida overturned the conviction.248 
More that 160 pregnant women across twenty- four states have been arrested for 
drug use.  Of the women pleading not guilty, none were convicted.249  Prosecutors 
are losing these cases.  The courts are finding that these criminal statutes are not 
intended to regulate pregnant women and that the prosecutors’ theories are 
inappropriate.250  However, the general tone is that they are willing to punish 
pregnant women for their behavior.251 
There are four states that have carried this general tone by enacting statutes that 
make it illegal for HIV-infected women to give birth.252  These statutes make the 
knowing transmission of HIV illegal.253  Therefore, if a woman knows that she is 
HIV positive and then gives birth to a child, she may well have committed a felony. 
If theses statutes are used to prosecute women who give birth to HIV infected 
babies, the trend may be to also prosecute them for transmitting alcohol, legal 
substances, and nicotine to their fetus.  Making drug use during pregnancy a 
punishable crime should be carefully studied before implemented.  According to the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, “[p]unitive measures taken toward pregnant 
women, such as criminal prosecution and incarceration, have no proven benefits to 
infant health…such involuntary measures are likely to discourage mothers and their 
                                                                
245Id. 
246Id. at 421-22. Note that an infant is a person under the statute; therefore, the 
prosecutor’s only theory was to argue that the controlled substance was delivered once the 
fetus became an infant. 
247Id. 
248Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). 
249See Tamar Lewin, Drug Verdict Over Infants is Voided, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at 
B6. 
250See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1990) (“[t]o 
construe the statute in this manner would mean that every expectant mother who ingested a 
substance with the potential for harm to her child, e.g., alcohol or nicotine, would be 
criminally liable under R.C. 2919-22(A), [the child endangering statute]. We do not believe 
such a result was intended by the General Assembly.”). 
251See Ikemoto, supra note 20, at 1271. 
252See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, ¶ 12-
16.2 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. 
(Vernon Supp. 1992).  
253Id. 
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infants from receiving the very medical care and social support systems that are 
crucial to their treatment.”254 
Not only is there no real benefit to infant health in using criminal law, it attempts 
to define the ideal mother by negative implication in that it declares certain behaviors 
as nonmaternal.255  The prosecution of drug or alcohol use during pregnancy is  
counterproductive because it is overtly punitive rather than constructive. 
3.  Finding Child Neglect or Abuse Based on Mother’s Conduct  
During Pregnancy 
Civil child abuse and neglect statutes are also being used to regulate the conduct 
of pregnant women.  Although these cases are similar to the criminal prosecution 
cases in that the state steps in to protect a fetus and the woman is blamed for 
knowingly harming her child, this strategy has proven more successful than the 
criminal prosecution strategy.256  The state has a higher success rate in these cases 
and the women have a greater chance of losing their freedom, and their children, 
because the courts are more willing to recognize the fetus as a person.257  The issue is 
fetal personhood, and the corollary is maternal de-personhood.258 
In In re Troy D., the court recognized fetal personhood.259  The court reasoned 
that “the mother conducted herself in a manner that was dangerous to the child prior 
to the child’s birth but with full knowledge the child would be born…the petition 
was concerned with the protection of a living child, not with a fetus.”260  Some courts 
find this reasoning too encompassing.  A New York court addressed a similar issue 
stating that “[t]o carry the law Guardian’s argument to its logical extension, the State 
would be able to supercede a mother’s custody right to her child if she smoked 
cigarettes during her pregnancy, or ate junk food, or did too much physical labor or 
did not exercise enough.  The list of potential intrusions is long and constitute [sic] 
entirely unacceptable violations of the bodily integrity of women.”261 
The indirect regulation of pregnant women is more than just a theory.  When a 
court takes a child from his mother based on conduct during her pregnancy, it is 
exercising significant control over the woman.  The frame of maternal-fetal conflict 
is advancing under child abuse and neglect laws. 
                                                                
254Abigail English, Prenatal Drug Exposure & Pediatric AIDS: New Issues for Children’s 
Attorneys, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 452, 454 (1990) (quoting PROVISIONAL COMM. ON 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, AM. ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS, PEDIATRICS (Oct. 
1990)). 
255See Iketomo, supra note 20, at 1273.  
256Id. at 1275. 
257Id. 
258Id. 
259263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).  
260Id. at 872-74. 
261In re Torress, No. N-3968/88 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988). 
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VI.  ANALYSIS OF BALANCING FETAL AND MATERNAL RIGHTS 
The courts recognize a woman’s constitutional right to refuse to submit to 
medical treatment that violates her religious beliefs.  There are some that believe that 
this right should be absolute among competent women.262  State intervention in a 
pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment has been upheld through the 
application of a balancing test where the state interest in the fetus is balanced against 
the interest of the pregnant woman.263 
In 1981, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided Jefferson using this balancing 
test.264 The court balanced the rights of the fetus against the rights of the mother and 
concluded that the state’s interest in the rights of the fetus outweighed the rights of 
the mother.  This case established a pregnant woman’s duty to protect the health and 
welfare of her fetus.  The court asserted that it was balancing the state’s interest; 
however, this decision created rights in the fetus enforceable against the mother.265  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In this emotionally charged area of the law, the conflict between pregnant women 
who refuse medical treatment that may benefit their fetus and the medical profession 
or the judiciary that seeks to protect the health and welfare of those fetuses, is far 
from settled.  Whether it is a judge or a physician attending to this dilemma, the 
question remains the same: should a pregnant woman be compelled to submit to 
medical treatment that for her own reasons she does not want? 
This question cannot be answered solely on the basis of whether the mother or 
the fetus may suffer any physical detriment.  The fundamental ethical and legal 
values must also be taken into account and on balance, these values do not justify 
compelling a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment that she does not want. 
The law can take one of two paths when faced with such a dilemma.  The first 
path is to require the woman to submit to the medical treatment.  In doing this, the 
court places the pregnant woman in a relationship of servitude to her fetus and, thus, 
threatens the very core of her constitutionally- protected liberty. 
The second, more ethically and legally proper alternative, is to honor the 
woman’s refusal.  Society must protect the rights of all competent adults, including 
pregnant women, from forcible, intrusive, physical violations of their physical self.  
The plight between fetal health and maternal liberty is intertwined with moral and 
ethical dilemmas and the strong arm of the law will not eliminate the conflict. 
PAMALA HARRIS266 
                                                                
262See Nelson, supra note 26, at 709-11. 
263See In re Jamaica, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (using the balancing test, the court found the 
state’s interest outweighed the pregnant woman’s interest, but conceded that an opposite 
finding would result if the woman were not pregnant). 
264See Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (This was the first reported opinion of a court imposed 
surgery on a pregnant woman to benefit a fetus). 
265Id. 
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